These Concerns are not in priority order and may be considered subtle and arcane for some readers that have not studied the Special Operations Manual.
Concern 1: The Special Operations Manual documents are based on the Eisenhower Briefing Document (EBD), as the “mother” of the “daughter” documents they have spawned. The entire case for authenticity rests on the EBD. If the EBD is not authentic, then neither are the others. (Deuley, May 1999)
Response: There is no claim that the EBD is the generating document. It may turn out that some statements in the EBD are not true. There is no claim that this relates to the authenticity of the others, nearly all of which predate the EBD date of 18 November 1952. Each document needs to be examined on its own merits first. The authenticity of the EBD has been researched at length, (Friedman, 1989) and the newly released documents have been our main focus.
Concern 2: We claim that most people regard the Majestic Documents as genuine, and this is not true. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: We merely claim that the cynics have been saying that most people regard them as fakes. There is no evidence for either statement unless an objective poll were to be taken. We are stating that anyone who carefully looks at all the evidence objectively, without an a priori outcome expected, will conclude that there is no evidence of fakery. Just because some of them “could have been” faked has no relevance as to whether they were.
Concern 3: Our knowledge of the “graphics trade, old or new” is inadequate to correctly assess the authenticity of the documents. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: This concern would apply primarily to the Special Operations Manual, since the other documents were all done with typewriters, and really have little to do with “graphics trade.” If the documents are genuine, the “new” graphics trade is irrelevant. We have detailed information about the procedures used by the Government in 1954 for printing, and have numerous examples of type fonts, as well as the Style Manual for the era.
Concern 4: Faking documents is easy with the right equipment, and people will “do it for a giggle…” (Deuley, May 99)
Response: Careful Questioned Document Examiners will focus as much attention on the fake ones as on the genuine in order to learn to recognize them in the future. Nobody has created as acceptable fake of any of these documents so far. If it is so easy, it would be nice to see a fake page that was indistinguishable from our originals.
Concern 5: There is a concern that we are ignoring provenance, and the originals are required in order to make any statement about authenticity. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: Since we do not have the originals, and as in any case where the originals are unavailable, we are emphasizing the other ways to authenticate documents: typography, chirography, chronology, content, and authorship assessments. We agree completely that paper and ink tests of the originals would be the decisive factor that would permit one to say they they were from the right period. Even that, however, would not rule out the possibility that one or more of them are counterintelligence fabrications from that era, having nothing to do with confusing UFO researchers but more likely confusing our foreign enemies of the time.
Concern 6: We have not called up qualified document experts. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: We have identified some of our experts. For example, James Black is a former chairman of the Questioned Documents Subcommittee of the Forensic Sciences Committee of the American Society of Testing and Materials. He uses the usual tools of the forensic document examiner, and has provided concise statements about several of the documents. We have also used Speckin Forensic Laboratories to date and authenticate, watermarks, paper type and perform ink testing at considerable expense to the investigators.
Concern 7: Because the caveats MAJIC, Majestic or MJ-12 have been around earlier than 1984 when the EBD was allegedly found in the Jamie Shandera mailbox (Los Angeles), it is implied that some faker was at work. Tom Deuley was asked while he was an employee of the NSA to examine their relationship to UFOs. He determined that NSA records did not show any of them, and therefore there could have been no program. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: The lack of a record that was accessible at the NSA is totally unsurprising, if the project had been buried as deeply as implied and as stated in many references. Deuley surely did not have access to all NSA programs. It would be remarkably inept of the management of the Majestic Project to let it get in any accessible records of this sort. In addition, the identity of the person or people who asked about these caveats in 1980 or 1981 is a very important piece of information that should not be concealed. The discussion of a covert group’s existence during the Formation of the Fund for UFO Research in 1979 is a piece of history that should be shared unless confidentiality disclosures have been signed.
Concern 8: Research concerning the alleged crash reported in the EBD of a UFO crash on 6 December 1950 near the El Indio-Guerrero area of the Texas-Mexican border has conclusively shown that no such crash occurred. This proves that the EBD is false, and all documents that have “grown out of it” are likewise false. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: There is no relationship of the provenance between the EBD and the other Majestic documents. Indeed, there are at least five independent sources. The partial correlation of content of the EBD with the others is a research topic, not yet completed. Attempting to assess the probability that there was or was not a crash at the border at that time is being studied by others. We have come to no conclusion yet, not having seen all the evidence, including the reports on the interesting trips to the border alluded to in the reference.
Concern 9: The argument that some of the information in the EBD might be true and some false is bad logic. Either the EBD is all true or it is all false. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: It is well known that counterintelligence techniques blend true and false information, and to find part true, part false would be expected if it were a counterintelligence document. Every document needs to be careful evaluated on its own merits first and then for consistency with other documents, both questioned and genuine from FOIA or the open literature.
Concern 10: The existence of the FOIA’d Hillenkoetter letter stamped 12 Apr 1949 with the file distribution showing CIA Top Secret and MJ-12 could have been faked by sending a document “into the system” and have it come out again as FOIA. (Deuley, May 99)
Response: The FOIA offices in Government agencies are trying to respond to the legislation that forces them to release material to the public. Generally, they view it as a huge waste of time, although the FOIA personnel try to do their best. A faker conceivably could insert or modify a memo and get it into the FOIA system. However, the ability of counterintelligence personnel to penetrate the FOIA system should be assumed, and would be even easier.
Concern 11: On the Hillenkoetter letter stamped 12 Apr 1949, the distribution of CIA Top Secret would not make sense without a Division or a Department because there is so much TS at the CIA. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: MJ-12 is the file distribution. The Divison or Department would not be identified for such a covert project.
Concern 12: On the Hillenkoetter letter stamped 12 Apr 1949, the memo could have been easily faked. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: Faking the memo would have to include faking the NARA (National Archives & Records Administration) file number, the Hillenkoetter signature, and the file distribution. A questioned document examiner has determined that the same typewriter that did the body of the text did the file distribution, thereby eliminating the possibility that the MJ-12 was added to an otherwise genuine memo.
Concern 13: The FBI investigates all cases of classified documents leaking into the public realm, and they are apparently not investigating these Majestic documents now. This shows that the FBI thinks that they are fake. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: A book by Nick Redfern, 1998 The FBI Files: FBI’s UFO Top Secrets Exposed and one by Dr. Bruce Maccabee (in publication, 1999) both discuss the FBI involvement with UFOs in copious detail. The fact that the FBI is saying nothing through their public relations at this time should surprise nobody.
Concern 14: Tom Deuley’s personal assessment while an employee of the NSA led him to conclude that there was no covert program on this topic, and that he would have found out if there had been. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: This observation is also expected if the project is buried deep black or if the NSA did not even know about it. We think the latter to be unlikely. There is no discriminant here. Indeed, if the covert program were to be operating outside the purview of the Government, but using Government Agencies as a natural part of the cover, we would expect to see no accessible records by “non-cleared” employees such as Tom Deuley, even though he was in communications security (COMSEC) at the time, and may have had access to dozens of compartmentalized projects.
Concern 15: The reference to a witness who had shredded both the EBD and the SOM 1-01 while working in an Admiral’s office is unimpressive because one would expect to see authorization and destruction records. The absence of such records implies that the story is invented. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: We have 1.5 hours of tape recording in May 1999 of this witness who tells a consistent story dating to 1976. He confirmed the Deuley suspicion that the Admiral had a personal interest, but with details that move this report towards higher credibility than originally thought. The report is being transcribed and will be published with the permission of the witness.
Concern 16: Personnel like Tom Deuley who work in a classified environment and who also have an interest in UFOs can built up their own files and even circulate them to others. Ultimately, they get ordered for destruction and would be potentially included in FOIA files even if they were originally fake, such as the EBD might have been. Thus, even material appearing in FOIA files is not ensured to be authentic. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: This is a prescient scenario, and could easily happen. This kind of thing is what makes it so difficult to discriminate between the fake and the genuine, and also underscores the merits of having original copies, which we unfortunately do not have except for the Cutler memo found in the archives by Jamie Shandera and William Moore.
Concern 17: The interest that we have expressed in fake documents, and their relative absence from this discussion, implies that we are unaware that documents can be faked and often are. We should go to Richard Hall’s place (long-time distinguished Chairman of the Fund for UFO Research) and ask to see fakes, because he has many. These fakes have been disregarded and discarded. (Deuley, May 99).
Response: The existence of fakes by questioned document examiners is never at issue. For example, based on what little we have seen of the so-called “Aquarius Documents” we would think that they are indeed fake. Fakery should be assessed using the full range of techniques, and should be just as publishable as the authentic ones. If the characteristics of fake UFO documents are quantified, we will be adding to our ability to discriminate the fake from the genuine. The motives of the people producing fake documents need also to be identified and prioritized, so we can anticipate the patterns of deception. Ignoring fake documents is the equivalent of the Department of the Treasury ignoring the processes to make counterfeit money.
Concern 18: The SOM-01-1 manual arrived in the mail to Don Berliner as a roll of film from an anonymous source. This immediately raises suspicions, since there is no identifiable source whose veracity and reputation can be checked and no original documents that can be subjected to forensic analysis. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999).
Response: The postage meter data, the date, and the city all provide significant clues to locating the person who mailed this roll of film. It is not unlikely that the original will be located. When this happens, it will be possible to date the ink and the paper. When it turns out to be a 1954 vintage, there will no doubt be immediate claims that is was a 1954 counterintelligence hoax.
Concern 19. Documents and materials with high classifications have special provisions attached to them to ensure the ability to trace them at all times and to verify their integrity, until they are destroyed or declassified. The security markings on the SOM-01-1 document do not conform to required security procedures established for all agencies by presidential executive orders. In some instances they are totally contrary to established security procedures. No internal evidence exists in the document to show that proper accountability was exercised by the document’s custodians. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: (1) “Presidential executive orders established for all agencies” implies that we would expect to see identical security procedures wherever one looked. In fact, there are clear examples of the CIA and the DoD and the old AEC and the State Department using different markings and procedures in this era. Today, many things may be the same, but we are talking about 1954. It is true there is no internal evidence to show that the copy that was photographed had a copy control number, but it was issued to Kirtland AFB as seen on the reverse side of the cover page. If it were the only copy given to Kirtland, that would be a control.
Concern 20. The inclusion of some accurate information has been cited as proof of authenticity, whereas it could equally well be interpreted as a cut-and-paste job to lend an air of authenticity. Partially legitimate but altered UFO-related documents are already known to exist. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: Simply saying that it “could equally well be interpreted as a cut-and-paste job” has no bearing on whether it was. We should be looking for evidence, not speculation, in document authentication. We are eagerly collecting known fake documents that have fooled questioned document examiners because there are so few.
Concern 21. The content of the manual is strikingly inappropriate for its stated purpose. A field manual for dealing with crashed craft and alien bodies would have no reason to include (a) information on UFO history, (b) a chart of UFO types, (c) information concerning radar detection of UFOs, (d) a list of natural and artificial aerial phenomena which can be mistaken for UFOs. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: The Joint Statement authors offer their opinion that the manual “would have no reason to include…” On the contrary, it is easy to imagine (a) that the leaders had found that all people hunger for a bit of history on this topic and they didn’t want have the troops waste time in speculation; (b) they needed a chart of UFO types to get a feeling for what they might be up against; (c) there really wasn’t any radar information — it just said that radar had determined the shapes and sizes to be this or that; (d) the list of phenomena was provided (actually, all unclassified) so that they were not fooled themselves if they were in the field. . The phrase “would have” implies speculation. Our response, using “could have” also implies speculation. Speculation is not usually an effective authentication technique.
Concern 22. Military manuals of this type establish standards and define tasks that must be performed to accomplish the mission. The manual fails to establish such standards and is completely silent on personnel qualifications and equipment requirements. Furthermore, the methods of recovery and site security described in the manual are inadequate and tactically unsound. Regulations, materials, and training publication references cited are grossly inadequate or missing.. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: (4) This military manual clearly is trying to tell the troops or civilian personnel (if they were CIA) in the field how to go out, recover the parts, the bodies, where to send them, and how to keep the public in the dark. Personnel and equipment requirements need not go in an instruction manual. The people reading it were selected to read it and do the job. It is not clear why the methods of recovery and site security are inadequate and tactically unsound. If regulation, material, and training publication references are always required by DoD manuals, perhaps this strongly suggests that it was a CIA manual, and they decided not to bother with those items. Some of the references on page 28 of the Manual are precisely the same references as those listed in other field manuals obtained from the Archives. There are many exceptions to procedures over the years. Furthermore, the statement that implies that the CIA and the DoD have identical security procedures is patently false.
Concern 23. When it comes to analysis of 2nd and 3rd and nth generation copies of documents, forensic analysis is almost impossible. Content analysis already has shown serious problems with MJ-12 related documents. (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: For SOM1-01 the copies were first generation prints from the negatives directly. Unfortunately, the photographer was not careful to keep all frames in perfect focus, so a few are blurred, one almost beyond deciphering. Good copies of these are available to anyone who will buy them in “The Majestic Documents.” R. M. Wood paid approximately $10 per print to get them from the negatives. Some of the pages are in beautiful focus, so it is almost possible to confirm the fact that the type font is Monotype Modern for the main text, the font that was in use at the Government printing agencies in 1954, the date of the manual.
Concern 24. “The only way SOM-01-1 and other alleged “documentary proof” of MJ-12 could conceivably be authenticated would be by locating a documentary paper trail of certifiably original documents in government archives, or in private papers of important people. Even then, allegedly authentic documents would need to be subjected to forensic examination to determine such things as the age of the paper. In addition, document experts would need to examine them for internal accuracy and style. Given the track record of fake documents and shoddy scholarship, rigorous peer review is essential.” (Joint Statement by Aldrich, Berliner, Deuley, Hall, Rodeghier, 1999)
Response: There is much merit in having original documents and an established provenance. However, we do not have that. If one were to adopt a policy of ignoring all but original documents, one would automatically reject all copies of genuine documents. Since the use of copiers is the most likely way that classified documents would be leaked, that is the equivalent of rejecting all documents that would show significant Government involvement in covert and classified UFO work.
Concern 25: Evidence exists that the documents are fraudulent. (Randle, 1997)
Response: No such evidence exists. The ability to discriminate the real from the fake is the correct way to view the issue.
Concern 26: A great deal of work went into construction, implying work by faker. Seal included to add visual impact. (Randle, 1997)
Response: The high quality of the manual is also consistent with production by the USGPO or CIA print shop equivalent. The War Department Seal was used on most manuals of that vintage. Examples abound.
Concern 27: The manual is short. It is missing some pages including photos. (Randle, 1997)
Response: If the manual were authentic, it would have been only long enough to accomplish purpose. Twenty-three frames are consistent with the photographer running out of film in a 20-roll.
Concern 28: Most members of UFO community believe the MJ-12 documents fake. However, each document should stand or fall on its own analysis. (Randle, 1997)
Response: “Most members” has no basis in any scientific poll. Yes, the document could and does stand on its own analysis. If the other documents were correlated, it would seem strange to ignore them. There is a distinct possibility that part of the Eisenhower Briefing Document is fake, but that the Manual is genuine.
Concern 29: “Eyes Only” is for a specific person; therefore, a manual would be inconsistent with this classification caveat. (Randle, 1997) Response: “Eyes Only” is not limited to specific persons. It means that it cannot be copied, but that everyone who sees it must sign a record. This allegation is obviously based on a false assumption.
Concern 30 The “real mistake” is the use of “Restricted” on the SOM1-01 cover. This category was canceled in November 1953, and manual date is April 1954. (Randle, 1997)
Response: The classification alluded to was “Restricted Data.” The use of the single word “Restricted” is not a classification but would be limiting distribution. Examples of manuals of the era exist having “Restricted” on the cover in the same style type.
Concern 31: If document does not conform to regulations, it implies hoax. Documents at this level would be closely monitored. (Randle, 1997) Response: There is no evidence that the document does not conform to the regulations of the era. In any case, this group, according to the document, could set their own rules.
Concern 32: Pankratz of the Eisenhower Library is cited as saying MAJIC EYES ONLY never existed. (Randle, 1997)
Response: Eisenhower Library would not have been given this data if the classification were genuine. Probably NSA does not know either. This classification is seen on documents only after 24 September 1947. Lack of official record does not discriminate. Officials will not release anything that is defined to be not for public inspection.
Concern 33: A real manual would not contain an obsolete classification mark. (Randle, 1997)
Response: Same old argument about “Restricted.” See examples in same type style. The level of people authorizing would have been the same level establishing the classification rules.
Concern 34: If the classification is a mistake, need examples of similar mistakes from authentic documents. (Randle, 1997)
Response: At the Top Secret level, most documents are not declassified yet, especially Code Word and Eyes Only. In addition, classification level in the Archives is not a category. Several documents at lower levels include “Restricted” and the War Department logo.
Concern 35: The security level of “2 points above Top Secret” does not exist. Text says, “no special group such as MJ-12 exists.” (Randle, 1997)
Response: The purpose of this sentence would be consistent with impressing the 1954 reader. One “point” might be the Code Word MAJIC, and the second, “Eyes Only.” The directions about the existence of the group are totally consistent with an authentic manual’s objectives: fully covert operations. Gen. Groves had a file “Above Top Secret.”
Concern 36: (Preceding) “paragraph is utter nonsense.” There are no classifications above Top Secret. (Randle, 1997)
Response: There may be no classifications above Top Secret, but the Manhattan Engineering District records may not be available, and they had their own rules. In the absence of detailed (classified) Classification Management Directives from this era, we do not really know. Not a discriminator.
Concern 37: Special Compartmented Information (SCI) would modify Top Secret legitimately. (Randle, 1997)
Response: True statement. Top Secret—MAJIC could have been a legitimate compartment designation, as the precursor of what we now call SCI. The current security procedures have their roots in the past, of course.
Concern 38: “Two points higher than Top Secret is ridiculous”— “There is no such classification.” (Randle, 1997)
Response: Same argument Concern 35. See rebuttal there. Today’s classification guidance is nearly irrelevant to what went on in 1954 or so.
Concern 39: There is no need to explain or justify the need for the high classification. (“Ridiculous”) (Randle, 1997)
Response: The classification of UFO recoveries and alien bodies is easily justified, as something the public should not know. The security of the program was one of the main objectives, according to the manual.
Concern 40: “The smoking gun proving the manual to be a hoax is …several references to Area 51 and S-4.” (Randle, 1997)
Response: Deep research shows that this region was obtained by the Government in 1951 for covert purposes. The references are still classified. This material is very impressive, and cannot be obtained easily. A 1951 newspaper article shows massive $300 million project underway in the area.
Concern 41: Designation Area 51 did not come into use until late 1950s. Thus, manual is a fake. (Randle, 1997)
Response: Same as above. The story of this land is deeply classified, even today. The initial Air Force memo released regarding the manual redacted all discussion of Area 51 S-4 in the unclassified version.
Concern 42: A lot of time was spent by someone creating the manual but he had not understood the classification system. (Randle, 1997) Response: A lot of time has been spent trying to replicate them to conform with US Government Printing Office (USGPO) practices of the time, unsuccessfully. The nominal Adobe Monotype Modern does not quite match the manual. If the manual is authentic, it was created with a Monotype machine that used a mechanical spacing technique with triangular shaped wedges. Today’s machines cannot replicate the fonts and spacing.
Concern 43: There is no doubt that the manual is nothing more than a fake. It does not conform to the regulations, contains inaccurate information, and is incomplete. (Randle, 1997)
Response: A summary of incorrect claims. The weight of the evidence is overwhelmingly consistent with an authentic document. Overall, the concerns raised by Randle do not include all those offered by the Air Force. He failed to cover the allegation that 1954 radars could not determine shape (they can, given several data records or air-to-air recordings); or that the manual in 1954 mentioned downed satellites as a legitimate argument to convince the nosy public to go away. It can be shown that the public would have been quite familiar with the reality of satellites. Furthermore, since the manual was first made available for research, a “change control” page has been found that clearly indicates the exact date of update of each changed page and the typed initials of the change control authority. Other naysayers had said that such a page must exist, and it does.
Concern 43. There is no significant provenance.
Response: Provenance is nice but sometimes not essential. However, the source section of this website discusses this concern in detail.
Concern 44. Use of the word “belief” implies an emotional position.
Response: We want to find the truth. We have studied the documents more than anyone else has so far. The words “consider” or “regard” are also perfectly good.
Concern 45. The use of the concept of a “zinger” is the equivalent of the “erosion of objectivity.”
Response: The evaluation of criteria other than provenance always recognizes a faker could be at work. We are just trying to assess how difficult it would have been for such a faker to have created whatever we are looking at. An exceptionally difficult item to have faked we elected to call a “zinger.”
Concern 46. We are inconsistent with Friedman’s TOP SECRET/MAJIC determinations of Cooper’s material.
Response: True. The authentication work is ongoing. Friedman may change his mind. We may change our mind. The logic processes, however, should be available for inspection. Friedman has excellent archive contacts and they are very helpful.
Concern 47. Fakers have lots of time to dig around archives and get the proper paper.
Response: There can be extremely subtle differences between the genuine and the fake in language and style; the presence of incredibly arcane confirmed detail is very unlikely in a fake.
Concern 48. Since we did not discuss all the documents the investigators have, it is a “cover-up.”
Response: We chose to not overload the community with documents of whose authenticity we are unsure. In the case of SOM1-01 we have no other leaked documents that are relevant.
Concern 49: “…the validity of this document (Manual) depends entirely on the reality of the original EBD MJ-12 document, which I have pointed out has a serious problem.” (Deuley, June 99).
Response: The validity of the Manual is totally independent of that of the EBD: it came from a different source, it is printed instead of typed document, and can stand alone in its integrity.
Concern 50: Regardless of the amount of history the term “satellite” had prior to 7 April 1954 (the date of the Manual) it would have had to have been in general usage to have appeared in a document of this nature; otherwise no one would have known what the author was talking about. (Deuley, June 99).
Response. If you look at the Manual on its page 8, it is readily seen that the phrase “downed satellites” is among five deceptive statements offered to keep people away, the others being meteors, weather balloons, military aircraft, and toxic spills. Deceptive statements are often untrue. If you are trying to keep people away, you tell them whatever sells. Furthermore at that time in 1954, there were references in the open literature talking about our plans for satellites — some of them are detailed, with military plans behind them. The public was exceptionally interested in the subject at this time, as evidenced the by references shown below.
The Flying Saucer Conspiracy, Donald E. Keyhoe, 1953The Mars Project, Wernher von Braun, University of Illinois Press, 1953 “Astronomy from the Space Station,” Fred L. Whipple, Sky and Telescope, April 1953, p. 151 “Testing of Relativity Theory with an Artificial Satellite,” J. Astronomical Society of the Pacific, February 1954 “Second Moon?,” Time Magazine, March 15, 1954, p. 83 Colliers references on manned space flight by von Braun, pre-1954
Furthermore, those guarding the side had weapons to enforce their position. The selection of the downed satellite as a choice for deception was clearly a very innovative counterintelligence choice.
Concern 51: Commander Deuley regards the excellent document control procedures we have would have demanded the presence of security markings that appear to be absent, and that his extensive experience with COMSEC (Communications Security) qualifies him to make judgements with regard to security procedures. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: Tom Deuley has no doubt had a distinguished career in this kind of work. There are, however, three problems with this extrapolation: (1) There unlikely that he was familiar with the procedures in use for top secret code word material in 1954; (2) this project, by its own definition, would have been “buried” so that it would not be accessible to someone looking for a record in the late 70s; (3) the more important the project and the higher ranking the leaders are, the less they pay attention to format as opposed to intent.
Concern 52: The cover has a marking, “restricted” that would normally be at the bottom of each and on the top and bottom of subsequent pages as well. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: The use of the single word “restricted” on the cover is consistent with the practice of limiting distribution, independent of classification. It is not related to the “restricted data” caveat. See the attached example for representative use on a field manual on the cover. The fact that it appears only on the cover support the “distribution-limiting” hypothesis. However, since it is not know whether the CIA or a DoD agency produced this Manual, one does not even know which document control measures to apply. Publication would be consistent with the expectation of the use of paramilitary forces together with military.
Concern 53: The document does not have a short title. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: It was not customary to use “short titles” at that time. There is no provision for it in the US Government Printing Office Style Manual.
Concern 54. The marking TO 12D1-3-11-1 should be traceable to some department or branch. . (Deuley, June 99).
Response. According to the nomenclature system then in use for Air Force Technical Orders, the “12” was ???, the “D” was ???, the “3” was ??? and the “11” was ???. The final “1” is consistent with the first revision of the document, that has the number of 1-01. It merely means that it is the first revision of the first document in the series. Find the Westwood paper on this.
Concern 55. The use of the word “group” in” Majestic-12 Group” on the cover seems inappropriate for an entity reporting to the President of the United States; one would expect it to be the responsibility of a Department. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: If this entity reported directly to the President, there would be no need to add an intermediate Department such as the Army or the CIA.
Concern 56: The kerning on the title: “EXTRATERRESTRIAL ENTITIES AND TECHNOLOGY, RECOVERY AND DISPOSAL” and TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY are not correct. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: This concern is due to looking at only a poorly reproduced copy. Copies in the Wood and Wood, 1998 do show this problem.
Concern 57: The use of the word entities is bothersome because it was used in the EBD, which has been shown to be fraudulent. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: The word “entities” is used in a number of the Majestic documents, as well as the acronym EBE standing for Extraterrestrial Biological Entities. If some parts of the EBD are fraudulent, it may not be relevant. The Manual can stand alone as almost certainly genuine in its original form.
Concern 58: The use of the word “disposal” is a poor choice of words for the function described, and does not show up in the Table of Contents. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: This is the way the Army would have talked in 1954, and furthermore, the word disposal is used in the document twice more: once on the Table of Contents and once on page 10, alluding to the disposal of any device by the RED TEAM.
Concern 59. The warning notice ends in with the word “law” on one line, a widow, to be avoided in a professional document. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: Remarkably, the USGPO Style Manual makes no statement about widow words, but about “widow lines at the top of pages to be avoided.” A typesetter on a hot lead press would not be asked to redo the line under the style manual guidance in force at the time. Manuals of the era contain numerous widow words like this.
Concern 63. MAJIC-12 would not be a clearance level, since the levels are Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. If MAJIC is anything it is a code word, and in this case, it would be making reference to a compartment. (Deuley, June 99).
Response: If this program were genuine, the leaders would have felt perfectly comfortable defining this as a clearance level, outside of the DoD domain.